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Abstract: The aim of this work is to analyze and describe the interaction between a residential consumer and the power
network. With the growth of power systems and the advent of new energy sources, such as solar energy, it seems to be
more essential to investigate how the network and the consumer can interact with each other to achieve more financial
benefits. To do that, a static game is defined considering the fact that there is a direct relationship between the amount
of load shifted by the consumer and the incentive oﬀered by the network. It is concluded that the Nash equilibrium
of this game is when the consumer decides to cooperate with the network during non-peak hours. Finally, a simple
optimization problem is defined in which both the consumer and power network try to achieve better financial benefit
considering the fact that in the real world the total load of a typical residential consumer can be divided into the flexible
and inflexible parts. A time-varying pricing scenario as well as time-of-use and constant pricing scenarios is used. It is
concluded that the more convenient scenario for the consumer is the time-of-use scenario, whereas the power network
would prefer to use a dynamic one as it leads to more financial benefit.
Key words: Energy pricing, game theory, Nash equilibrium, residential consumer, energy consumption optimization

1. Introduction
Correct and rational use of energy and its products is associated with human behavior. Considering this issue,
diﬀerent solutions have been proposed to minimize the amount of energy consumption, such as environmental
design, enforcement by the government, and use of modern technologies. However, many experts believe in
voluntary energy saving by consumers as the best way to achieve eﬃcient use of energy. Thus, many works have
focused on finding ways for encouraging people to reduce their total use of energy.
In the case of electrical energy consumption optimization, both the consumer and the energy provider
should be taken into account. This means that it may be useful to know the amount of consumer demand
during each daily or monthly period and also the mechanism used for electricity pricing by the energy provider
during these periods.
Economic eﬃciency is one of the main goals of energy pricing and is considered in determining electricity
tariﬀs. Each consumer should pay the cost that is imposed to the network to provide electricity. Since electricity
is considered as a commodity that should be produced and sold from the perspective of the consumers and the
network respectively, diﬀerent economic theories can be used for electricity pricing based on the economic
eﬃciency criterion. According to this criterion, the marginal cost of producing goods or services is used as
∗ Correspondence:
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the basis of the pricing procedure. Therefore, it may seem rational to use the long-term costs as the basic
criterion for electricity pricing. If so, all consumers are not charged with a same electricity price, i.e. each
consumer’s energy payment is diﬀerent and is proportional to the cost that is imposed to the power system
by him. However, there are some challenges such as the variation of electricity production during peak and
non-peak hours that make policy makers use the average cost of energy consumed during a prespecified time
period instead of marginal cost. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider electricity as a commodity and manage
its consumption using economical concepts and methods.
Many studies have been published on the energy pricing issue and the basis of almost all of them is timevarying pricing methods. In [1] the market clearing price was estimated a day ahead. In [2] and [3], game theory
and the behavior of price suggested by other companies were proposed respectively for choosing the optimal
pricing strategy. The real-time pricing method is one of the best appropriate approaches for peak-shaving and
load-shifting, which was investigated in [4–7]. Doostizadeh and Ghasemi in [8] determined real-time prices by
solving an optimization problem based on maximizing the benefit of the energy provider, while [9–11] used
the detailed data of residential consumers to investigate the eﬀect of daylight savings time on electrical energy
consumption. In [12] it was also shown that in the electrical energy market in Sweden, consumers had shifted
their consumption to non-peak periods in accordance with the real-time pricing signals. In [13] energy provided
from renewable sources such as solar energy was emphasized and electricity generation from photovoltaic panels
according to diﬀerent tariﬀs related to diﬀerent daily hours was studied. Furthermore, [14] showed that two
important factors that determine the amount of residential consumption are climate conditions and building
characteristics. It was also remarked in this study that freezers and refrigerators determine the amount of base
load of a residential consumer, while high consuming appliances such as electrical heaters and air conditioners
are related to the peak load consumption. On the other hand, the time-of-use (TOU) pricing strategy, which
is one of the most common methods of demand-side management, was investigated in [15–18]. In [19] it was
shown that households are significantly price-elastic from the statistic point of view and they respond to realtime pricing scenarios by shifting their energy consumption from peak hours. In [20] the eﬀect of rebound
of urban residential electrical energy consumption in China using a linear approximation of the almost ideal
demand system model was investigated. It showed that the eﬀect of rebound after the implementation of
increasing-block electricity tariﬀ policy was improved. In [21] it was shown how technologies can aﬀect the
consumer willing to accept the real-time pricing methods. In [22] it was also demonstrated that pricing as a
function of demand variability, which is called first derivative ratio pricing, has advantages over the TOU pricing
method. In [23–25] the existing potential of residential demand response aiming at greenhouse gas reduction
was investigated, and [26–29] also used diﬀerent pricing strategies for peak and non-peak hours to smooth the
household load curve.
Despite this interest in the field of electrical energy pricing, most previous works only focused on the
formulization of real-time pricing methods in the form of mathematical equations. However, a neglected issue is
that almost none of these papers considered the related concepts of this field all together, such as the relationship
between the incentive oﬀered by the power network and the amount of load shifted by the consumer, the type
of the consumer’s load, or the equilibrium point when both the consumer and power network decide to take
part in a game. This paper tries to analyze some of these concepts and bring them together. This paper also
investigates which types of pricing methods will lead to the best financial benefit for the consumer and the
power network in the electrical energy market of Iran. To do that, the prices enacted by the Ministry of Energy
of Iran are used.
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In this paper, 3 diﬀerent pricing methods including constant and time-varying ones and related approaches
are investigated. First the relationship between the incentive oﬀered by the network and the amount of shifted
load is described. The behavior of a typical residential consumer against diﬀerent prices during peak and nonpeak hours determined by the network is then analyzed in the form of a static game. In the next section,
the collaboration of both the consumer and the power network is illustrated and finally numerical results are
presented.
2. Incentive oﬀering and load shifting
In order to make our analyses practical, we can introduce the pay-oﬀ functions for each participant. This
was fully detailed in [30]. In [30] both the power network and the consumer have their own pay-oﬀ functions,
and an additional cost function is also introduced, which is related to the amount of energy consumption
shifted to another time period per kWh. As described in [30], this kind of cost function should have 4 special
characteristics: 1) its first derivative should be positive for positive x, 2) its second derivative should also be
positive, 3) it should have a vertical asymptote, and 4) it should be equal to zero at x = 0. These characteristics
will make the cost function more practical. It should be noted that x is the amount of shifted load. Furthermore,
the vertical asymptote is used because the amount of load that the consumer can shift is limited to a due to
the physical conditions. Considering these characteristics, it may be possible to use a logarithmic cost function
as in [30] or an exponential one as below.
f (x) =

ea − e(a−x)
a−x

(1)

Although this is not the case, it should be noted that in the above formula choosing the amount of a is arbitrary
and is related to the physical conditions of the consumer. Other parameters that should be considered are the
network’s benefit obtained through load shifting and the incentive payment per unit of the shifted load. In
[30] the authors showed that, from their mathematical point of view, when there is no incentive payment there
will be no load shifting. On the other hand, the consumer will decide to shift some parts of his load when the
incentive oﬀered by the network or the energy provider is more than zero. Interestingly, this relationship shows
that the amount of incentive oﬀered by the network aﬀects the amount of shifted load positively. Although this
fact is obvious, it should be noted that this is obtained from a mathematical point of view considering several
assumptions, which makes the results more practical.
3. Static game
Considering the relationship between the oﬀered incentive and the shifted load, which was described in the last
section, a static game is formed in which the consumer and the power network are players. These players and
their strategies are defined as follows.
3.1. Players of the game
Network: In this paper, the Iran Grid Management Company is considered as the network and is represented in
the formulas as NET. The grid manager or the network has a duty to transfer the electricity from the supplying
point to the delivery point. The transition of energy is in fact the injection of the electricity into the grid at a
point (point of supplier) and receiving the reduced amount of energy due to the losses at another point (point
of consumer).
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Household (residential consumer): The residential consumers (natural persons) have all or part of
their required electricity supplied by one or more electricity providers and receive it through the power network.
In this paper, the household is represented by C . Refrigerators, freezers, heating and cooling systems, and
other appliances, such as washing machines, form the major part of this kind of consumer load.
3.2. Strategies of players
Network: Buying and selling electricity, energy market management, organizing the transmission of information between suppliers and consumers, and the associated financial needs are done by the grid management
company (GMC), which in this paper is named as the market manager or grid manager. The market manager
can determine diﬀerent prices for selling electricity per kWh in peak and non-peak periods. The network thus
has 2 strategies: determining the price of electricity during peak hours (λ) and during non-peak hours (v).
The set of strategies can be shown as below.
SN ET = {λ, ν}

(2)

Household: The residential consumer reacts to the high prices determined by the GMC during peak
hours in 3 ways. These are: 1) reducing the consumption and not shifting the amount of reduction to non-peak
hours, 2) reducing the consumption and shifting the amount of reduction to non-peak hours, and 3) selfgeneration of electricity. The disadvantages of these 3 ways are losing social welfare, needing further scheduling,
and additional costs due to the fuel and maintenance of generators, respectively.
If the benefits of reduction of consumption during peak hours exceed the costs generated, the households
will reduce their consumption. Otherwise, they will be indiﬀerent to the high prices assigned for peak hours
and no reduction in their consumption will happen. The household strategies can be written as cooperation
with the GMC (Q) or disassociation from it (µ).
SC = {µ, Q}

(3)

3.3. Payoﬀs of the game
The game is stationary because the second player (the consumer) does not have any knowledge about the prices
of electricity suggested by the GMC during peak and non-peak hours, but he knows that prices during peak and
non-peak hours are high and low, respectively, and also there is no other information about the exact prices.
Therefore, as will be described later, this situation will lead to the shifting of load from peak hours to non-peak
hours.
In conclusion, 4 possible situations according to both players’ strategies are as follows:
- Situation 1: The network chooses strategy λ and the consumer chooses strategy µ .
- Situation 2: The network chooses strategy v and the consumer chooses strategy µ .
- Situation 3: The network chooses strategy λ and the consumer chooses strategy Q.
- Situation 4: The network chooses strategy v and the consumer chooses strategy Q .
This game can then be defined in the following form:
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a) Set of players
N = {N ET, C}

(4)

SC = {Q, µ}SN ET = {λ, ν}

(5)

S = SN ET × SC = {λ, ν} × {Q, µ} = {(λ, Q), (ν, Q), (ν, µ), (λ, µ)}

(6)

b) Set of strategies related to each player

c) Set of 4 possible situations

d) Payoﬀs for each player: since in this game there are 2 players with independent strategies, the payoﬀs for
each of them is ranked in the range of 1 to 4 as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Player’s payoﬀs.

UN ET (λ, µ) = 1
UN ET (ν, µ) = 2
UN ET (λ, Q) = 3
UN ET (ν, Q) = 4

UC (λ, µ) = 1
UC (ν, µ) = 3
UC (λ, Q) = 2
UC (ν, Q) = 4

Elements of S show all the situations that are the combinations of the strategies of both players. The
aim is to find the combination of strategies that leads to the best payoﬀ for each player. This is called the
equilibrium point of the game. It should be noted that in this game both players are assumed to be rational,
i.e. whatever the other player chooses, none of them will choose the strategy that leads to less benefit for
themselves. Another assumption is that there is no collusion behavior between the network and the consumer.
The payoﬀs are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Player’s payoﬀs in the strategic form of the game.

GMC

Household

λ

v

μ

1.1

3.2

Q

2.3

4.4

There are 2 numbers in each cell of Table 2. The left and right numbers represent the payoﬀs of the
consumer ( C) and the grid manager (NET ), respectively. It should be noted that, according to game theory,
there might be one or more answer for a typical game, which are called the Nash equilibrium points of the game.
Furthermore, Nash equilibrium is reached when both players play rationally. This means that first each player
should choose the strategy that leads to the best payoﬀ for him according to the strategy that is chosen by the
other player, and secondly each player should have a correct preassumption about the strategy that the other
player may choose. Accordingly, in this paper, there is only one Nash equilibrium point for the game described
in Table 2, as below.
∗
∗
N (G) = {(SN
ET , SC ) : (ν, Q)}

(7)
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According to Table 2, the payoﬀ for each player that leads to Nash equilibrium is 4. In Table 2, the best payoﬀ
for each player is underlined and, as can be seen, Nash equilibrium occurs when the consumer and the grid
manager choose strategies Q and v , respectively. Choosing strategy v by the grid manager means that he
decides to apply low prices during non-peak periods in order to decrease the cost of electricity generation. In
fact, this is an incentive for households to shift their load from peak hours to non-peak hours and therefore the
energy demand during peak hours will decrease. On the other hand, choosing strategy Q by the consumer also
means that the best strategy for him is to shift his load from peak hours to non-peak hours according to prices
suggested by GMC. It can be concluded that Nash equilibrium of this game occurs when the grid manager
suggests a price for non-peak periods and the consumer decides to cooperate with him.
Until now, it was concluded that there is a positive relationship between the amount of load shifted by the
consumer and the incentive oﬀered by the network, and also the best strategy for the consumer is to cooperate
with the network. These facts, which were obtained from a mathematical point of view, exist in the real world
and any rational consumer or grid manager will choose these strategies when meeting these situations.
4. Energy consumption optimization problem
In this section, it is assumed that both the consumer and the power network are in the equilibrium point of
the game, which means that the consumer decides to cooperate with the network during non-peak hours. This
was described in the last section. Considering this assumption, a simple optimization problem is defined in
which the network tries to maximize his financial benefit, whereas the consumer is interested in minimizing his
cost. To make this optimization problem more practical, it is also assumed that a part of the total load of a
residential consumer is flexible and the remainder part is considered as inflexible. This is because there are
many appliances in a typical house that can be divided into 2 groups: those that should be plugged in daily
and have a fixed energy consumption, such as refrigerators, and those that are used occasionally or those that
have flexible energy consumption, such as washing machines or several types of cooling and heating systems.
In fact, the inflexible part of total load is constant and the consumer has no ability to change the amount of it
or to shift the hourly consumption from one hour to another one.
4.1. Network optimization problem
In the formulation of the network optimization problem both flexible and inflexible loads are included as the
network’s revenue. On the other hand, the GMC or the network should buy the amount of energy demanded
by the consumer from the energy providers (power stations). This is considered as a cost in the optimization
problem. The cost function of the power network that should be maximized for a period of Nm = 24 h is as
below.
Nm [
(
)
]
∑
fN ET =
pst ltf + lti − pkt Etk
(8)
t=1

Here, pst and pkt are the price of energy charged to the consumer and the price charged to the GMC from energy
providers, respectively. ltf and lti represent the amount of flexible and inflexible load, whereas Etk is the energy
purchased by GMC. It should be noted that pst is the only variable that should be optimized in the optimization
problem of the network during a prescribed period of time. In this paper, the energy optimization problem is
considered between a single residential consumer for which the consumption will not exceed several kW and a
power network for which its duty is to provide the energy demanded by this consumer. Since in this paper there
is not a wide perspective on the problem, i.e. there is just one single residential consumer, the optimization
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problem is a simple one, and no constraint on power balance between load and energy purchased by GMC is
included. In this model, it is assumed that both players had agreed on the maximum, minimum, and average
value of the energy price for every 24 h. These are formulated as follows.
∀t ∈ m

pst ≥ pmin

(9a)

∀t ∈ m

pst ≤ pmax

(9b)

1 ∑ s
p = pAV G
24 t=1 t
24

(9c)

Here, pmin and pmax are the minimum and maximum price charged to the consumer, respectively,
whereas pAV G is the average daily price. The first constraint shows that the price suggested by the power
network should be placed within the range [pmin , pmax ]. The second constraint describes that the power
network should consider low prices during some periods to keep the average value fixed. In the absence of this
constraint, the power network has no obligation to choose low prices and will prefer high prices for all the day.
4.2. Consumer optimization problem
As described in the first paragraph of this section, the consumer has the ability to shift only the hourly
consumption of the flexible part of his load. In this paper, a heat pump is considered as the flexible load. This
kind of load consists of a heating pump, a condensed tank, and the floor heating pipes, which are used to keep
the indoor temperature of the room within the comfort band. This kind of load and its characteristics and the
associated dynamic model were fully described in [31]. In this model, first the state space model of the heating
system is defined, and then the discrete form of the state model is used as the constraints of the optimization
problem. The objective function of the consumer optimization problem that should be minimized is as below.
fC =

Nm [
∑

pst ltf + λφt

]
(10)

t=1

In the above formula,

φt and λ represent the deviation from the comfort band and the associated

penalty, respectively. It should be noted that ltf and φt are the variables that should be optimized. This
objective function consists of 2 terms. The first one is the cost that the consumer should pay to the GMC
for the consumption of energy during the simulation period. The second one is the penalty that enforces the
consumer to keep the temperature of the room within the reference band. Three groups of constraints are also
defined for this optimization problem.
f
f
i
w
o
Tti = a11 Tt−1
+ a12 Tt−1
+ a13 Tt−1
+ b1 lt−1
+ e1 Tt−1

(11a)

f
f
i
w
o
Ttf = a21 Tt−1
+ a22 Tt−1
+ a23 Tt−1
+ b2 lt−1
+ e2 Tt−1

(11b)

f
f
i
w
o
Ttw = a31 Tt−1
+ a32 Tt−1
+ a33 Tt−1
+ b3 lt−1
+ e3 Tt−1

(11c)

f
ltf ≥ lmin

(12a)
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f
ltf ≤ lmax

(12b)

i
Tti + φt ≥ Tt,min

(13a)

i
Tti − φt ≤ Tt,max

(13b)

φt ≥ 0

(13c)

Here, Tti , Ttf , Ttw , and Tto are the indoor temperature, floor temperature, water tank temperature,
i
i
represent the minimum and maximum of indoor
and outdoor temperature, respectively. Tt,min
and Tt,max
f
f
temperature, and lmin
and lmax
are the minimum and maximum amounts of flexible load. Eqs. (12a)–(12c)

represent the constraints obtained from the state space model of the heating system. Eqs. (13a) and (13b)
state that the energy consumption of the heat pump should stay within a lower and upper limit. Eqs. (14a)
and (14b) also describe the conditions in which the temperature room may deviate from the comfort band. If
so, an additional cost ( λφt ) is added to the cost of energy consumption.
4.3. Pricing methods
In order to analyze the interaction between the network and the consumer, 3 scenarios are used for pricing. These
scenarios are called constant, TOU, and dynamic pricing, and they are fully described in the next subsections.
Constant pricing scenario: In this scenario, the GMC guarantees to provide the required electricity
for the consumers with a constant price. On the other hand, the GMC should buy this amount of energy from
the energy providers with a variable price. This kind of pricing might be favorable for those consumers who
cannot forecast their hourly consumption, those who are not interested in taking risks, and those who have low
energy consumption. It should also be noted that there is no interaction between the consumer and the network
in this scenario, and therefore the network optimization problem is not included.
TOU pricing scenario: This pricing method uses diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent periods. In this method
the 24 h of a day are split into peak, flat, and valley hours according to the daily recorded consumption of a
residential consumer, and then 3 diﬀerent prices are allocated for these periods. Therefore, in comparison with
the constant pricing method, the consumer takes some of the risk of energy management. Using this method,
the consumers become more interested in consuming energy during non-peak hours because of the associated
low prices. In fact, those consumers for whom most of the energy consumption occurs during non-peak periods
or consumers that have the ability to shift their load to low price periods can get more benefits from this kind
of pricing. As a result, like in the constant pricing scenario, in this scenario the network optimization problem
will not be included.
Dynamic pricing scenario: The third kind of pricing method and the most interesting one is called
dynamic pricing, in which the GMC suggests diﬀerent energy prices for every hour of the day. In the other
words, prices change hourly and both players, i.e. the grid manager and the consumer, have an active role in
the energy market.
It should be noted that in the case of a dynamic pricing scenario, the average value of the prices for every
24 h should be constant and equal to the value of the constant pricing scenario. This is important because this
constraint forces the network to consider low prices for some periods. Without this limitation it is reasonable
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that the power network suggests high prices to the consumer all the time. Furthermore, making a comparison
between 3 scenarios is possible in this way.
4.4. Results and discussion
Figure 1 shows the prices of energy that are charged to the GMC by the energy providers. These chosen prices
are available from the website of the Iran Grid Management Company, pertaining to 28 January 2011, which is
a winter day. This is because, in this paper, a heat pump that is used to keep the buildings warm is considered
as the flexible load, and so a winter day is chosen for simulations. In this paper, 20% of total load in each hour
is considered to be flexible, i.e. the consumer can shift all or part of this load to the next or previous hours
if necessary. After obtaining the total load from the website of the Iran Grid Management Company, 80% of
this load is considered as the inflexible or constant part of the load and is illustrated in Figure 2. It should
be noted that the total load available from this website pertains to the total consumption of all consumers
in Iran including residential, commercial, and industrial consumers in each hour. Therefore, the share of the
residential section is obtained by multiplying the total load by 0.3087. The energy consumption of every single
residential consumer is then obtained by dividing the total consumption of the residential section by 22,216,000.
These numbers are obtained by the Ministry of Energy of Iran and are available on the website of the Iran Grid
Management Company (http://www.igmc.ir/en/).
300

0.27

290

0.26
0.25

270
load [kwh]

price [Rial/kWh]

280

260
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240

0.24
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Figure 1. Hourly prices that are charged to the grid
manager.

5

10
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20

Day time (hour)

Figure 2. Residential consumer hourly load curve.

During non-peak hours the energy consumption is low, and so the cost of electrical energy generation is
low due to the using of a combined cycle power plant for providing electrical energy. On the other hand, during
peak hours where energy demand is high, the energy providers have to use low-eﬃciency power plants, such
as natural gas-fired power plants, to provide the additional required energy. Therefore, the cost of generating
electrical energy will increase, and as a result the price of energy delivered to consumers will also increase.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the price of electrical energy is high and low during peak and non-peak hours,
respectively. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in this paper, the amount of parameters needed for the
objective function and the constraints of the consumer optimization problem are the same as those defined in
[31].
Constant pricing scenario: As described in the last section, in this scenario the price of energy charged
2477

KHALEGHI FAR et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

by the network is considered to be constant during the simulation period. In this paper, the price of energy
is set to the value of 485 rial/kWh. It should be noted that the rial is the basic monetary unit of Iran. The
amount of flexible load in each hour is shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that there is no significant diﬀerence
between the minimum and maximum amount of flexible load during 24 h. In fact, because there is no financial
incentive for the consumer due to the constant price suggested by the network, he has not decided to apply any
shift in his energy consumption and has preferred to choose an approximately constant consumption.
TOU pricing scenario: In this kind of pricing method, the grid manager suggests 3 prices for peak,
valley, and flat periods. In this paper, it is considered that the consumption is charged at 785, 485, and 335
rial/kWh during peak, flat, and valley periods, respectively. These prices are the same as those suggested by the
Grid Management Company of Iran to be applied to the residential consumers. It should also be noted that, in
this paper, the first 8 h of the day (24–8) are considered as the valley period where the consumption is low, the

0.14

0.14

0.12

0.12

0.1

0.1
Load [kwh]

Load [kwh]

next 12 h (9–20) constitute the flat period, and the last 4 h (21–24) are the peak period. As can be predicted,
this scenario can provide incentive for the consumer to shift his load from peak hours to flat or valley hours
and therefore reduce his energy consumption cost. Figure 4 shows the amount of flexible load for each hour.
It can be seen that the consumer has shifted a big part of his load to the first hours of the simulation period
where the energy prices are low. It should be noted that, because there is a need to keep the room temperature
within the comfort range, it is obvious that there should be a little consumption during peak hours. In this
scenario the consumer consumes the same amount of energy as in the constant scenario, but reduces the cost
that should be paid to GMC.

0.08
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Figure 3. Flexible load curve obtained in the case of
constant pricing scenario.

5
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Figure 4. Flexible load curve obtained in the case of TOU
pricing scenario.

Dynamic pricing scenario: In the dynamic pricing scenario, the consumer tries to adjust his hourly
consumption to the prices suggested by the network. On the other hand, the grid manager wants to maximize
his revenue in accordance with the hourly energy consumption of the consumer. As described in Section 4.1,
in this scenario the average value of the energy price should equal the price suggested in the constant pricing
scenario. On the other hand, an amount of pmin and pmax equal to the minimum and maximum amount of
prices is suggested by the network in the case of the TOU pricing method. Figure 5 shows the hourly prices
charged by the grid manager in the dynamic pricing scheme. It can be seen that there are several hours with low
prices in the peak period and also several hours with high prices in the valley period. In fact, in this scheme the
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GMC has suggested some low prices in the peak period to provide an incentive for the consumer to encourage
him to consume a part of his required energy during peak hours. However, it should be noted that the average
price in the peak period is still greater than the prices in the valley and flat periods, and also the average value
of all prices in the 24-h simulation period is the same as the price in the constant pricing case.
Figure 6 shows the hourly flexible load consumption. It can be seen that the amount of consumption in
each hour is related to the price suggested by the network, i.e. when the price is low the consumption is high, and
vice versa. As mentioned before, in this paper just a single residential consumer is considered, whose electrical
energy consumption will not exceed several kW. In the case where there are a group of residential consumers
with diﬀerent types of appliances, the hourly prices suggested to each of them by the network and also their
load curves will diﬀer from each other. On the other hand, the total load curve is obtained by combining the
load curves of all consumers. In this way, the sharp rise and decline between successive hours, which is shown
in Figure 6, will be mitigated.
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Figure 5. Hourly prices suggested by the network in the
case of dynamic pricing scenario.
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Figure 6. Flexible load curve obtained in the case of
dynamic pricing scenario.

4.5. Numerical results
Figure 7 shows the results obtained for the consumer. It should be noted that the consumer’s cost is equal
to the grid manager’s revenue. According to Figure 7, in the case of the dynamic pricing scenario, the total
cost of buying energy from the network is maximum for the consumer. On the other hand, the TOU pricing
scenario results in the minimum cost. In fact, the cost of required energy for the flexible part of the total load
is maximum in the constant pricing scenario and minimum in the dynamic one. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the consumer has succeeded in minimizing his cost through shifting a part of his flexible load to the periods
with lower prices. It may thus be better for him to enter the contract with the network based on the TOU or
dynamic pricing.
According to Figure 7, the consumer has a daily cost of 3454.1256 rial in the case of the TOU pricing
scenario, which is the most cost-eﬀective one among these 3 scenarios. Therefore, he is to pay 103,623.768 rial
per month (30 days). Since electricity bills are issued every 2 months in Iran, this kind of consumer will receive
a bill for 207,247.536 rial for 2 months. It should be noted that almost 90% of residential consumers had to
pay 200,000 to 300,000 rial per month in 2012, which shows that our results are rational. In the same way, the
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cost of energy for the consumer will be 219,681.696 rials in the case of dynamic pricing for a 60-day period. As
a result, the maximum and minimum amount that should be paid by the consumer is 207,247.536 Rials and
219,681.696 Rials in the cases of TOU and dynamic pricing scenarios, respectively.
It may be useful to see how these diﬀerent pricing methods can aﬀect the network’s benefit. This is
shown in Figure 8. It can be seen that in the case of the dynamic pricing scenario, both the cost and revenue of
the network is higher in comparison with the other scenarios. Considering the fact that the network’s revenue
is the consumer’s cost, we can observe that the total benefit is considerably higher again in the case of the
dynamic pricing method. On the other hand, the TOU pricing method has led to less revenue and benefit
for the network, and therefore it might be concluded that this type of pricing is the least profitable scenario
for the network. It should be noted that the network optimization problem should not be solved when using
constant and TOU pricing scenarios, because in these cases there is no interaction between the consumer and
the network. Another thing that should be pointed is that, in these simulations, minimizing the cost of the
consumer is considered as the basis of dynamic pricing scenario. As it can be seen, in the dynamic pricing
scenario the network’s revenue, or in other words, the consumer’s cost, is considerably high compared to the
other methods.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, first the positive relationship between the amount of load shifted by a typical consumer and
the incentive suggested by the power network was described. This means that the consumer will incur fewer
penalties because of less consumption during peak hours, and is also given more discount for more consumption
during non-peak hours. A static game was then defined in which the residential consumer and the network
were the players of the game. It was concluded that the best strategy for the consumer is to cooperate with the
network during non-peak hours.
A simple optimization problem was also defined, in which a typical residential consumer tried to minimize
his costs, whereas the network was interested in maximizing its financial benefits. In this paper, the total hourly
load of the consumer was divided into the flexible and inflexible parts. To make our analysis practical, a heating
system was considered as the flexible part of the load and its consumption was assumed to be 20% of the total
load. Simulations showed that among the 3 diﬀerent pricing methods, the best one for the consumer and the
network are the TOU and dynamic methods, respectively.
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